Justice and the Public

Sentences can be criticized, but decisions must be understood

Roberto Gazzini

I followed the case of the American boys, Finnegan Elder and Natale Hjorth, accused of murdering Carabiniere Mario Cerciello Rega, for work. The harsh articles on the granting of house arrest to one of the two boys compel me to reflect on the value and importance of accurate journalistic narration, often influenced by lawyers and prosecutors who exploit it to tell their version of events, sometimes ignoring the laws and the Constitution.

To illustrate, I will recount the media stages of this tragic story. In 2020, in the first instance, the two boys were sentenced to life imprisonment. The maximum penalty was justified by the aggravating circumstance of resistance to a Public Official: the boys knew they were facing two carabinieri. No possibility of plea bargaining, ordinary trial, and maximum penalty. The press picked up on the widow’s lawyer’s comment, “The sentence is exemplary for having killed a servant of the State.”

In 2022, on appeal, the uncertainty of the identification of the carabinieri began to emerge, but the sentences remained high: 24 years for Elder and 23 for Hjorth. The defense appealed to the Court of Cassation, which in 2023 highlighted the shortcomings of the previous sentences. For Elder, the charge of resistance to a public official had to be reassessed, while for Hjorth, his willingness to participate in the murder had to be re-evaluated.

The new trial on July 3, 2024, clarified that the carabinieri did not have time to identify themselves, so the boys could not know they were law enforcement officers. This eliminated the aggravating circumstance for Elder, while for Hjorth, the charge was downgraded from moral complicity to anomalous complicity. The sentences were reduced to 15 years and two months for Elder and 11 years and two months for Hjorth. Essentially, the same penalties already imposed on appeal, but reduced by a third as provided by the abbreviated procedure (which was granted because the aggravating circumstances no longer applied).

The only dissenting comment in the media chorus crying scandal was from Davide Giacalone in this newspaper. Based on the facts and knowledge of the subject, he wrote, “There was no arbitrary reduction of the sentence. No habitual favoritism because the defendants are American citizens. The law was simply applied.”

When Hjorth’s lawyers requested and obtained house arrest for the boy following the sentence, the media gave ample space to the negative comments of the civil party lawyers, politicians, and the same Prosecutor General who appealed against the house arrest, highlighting the risk of flight and the possibility of re-offending (despite the boy’s passport being confiscated, his acceptance of the electronic bracelet, and the judges’ requalification of the crime from intentional to negligent, thus eliminating the danger of committing a similar crime to the one for which he was convicted). We will see how it ends.

After five years and five levels of judgment, it emerged that the boys did not know they were facing two carabinieri. They were waiting for the pusher from whom they had stolen the backpack, not two carabinieri, which significantly changes the reading of the event. A person died, and those who did wrong must pay, but the analysis of the facts can lead to different judgments in legal, media, and reputational terms. Merely reporting what the parties say from time to time is no longer sufficient for journalism. The lack of critical judgment does not allow readers to form a correct opinion.

This story reminds me of an article by Valentina Stella, whose title is as relevant as ever, “The Shock Sentences That Do Not Please Public Opinion,” which cited in a passage that justice should not be applied based on an opinion poll, but after a trial.